Marketing texts and the federal Do Not Call law

In Combs v. UG Franchise Operations (Oct. 2, 2026), Judge Kato denied a motion to dismiss that argued § 227(c)(5) does not reach texts. The order said Steidinger does not control outside the Seventh Circuit and looked instead to Ninth Circuit decisions that treated a text as a call. Miller v. S. Brown (Sept. 22, 2026) is a second contested order in this district that also declined to follow Steidinger.

In D'Agostino v. Circle K (Apr. 23, 2026), Judge Teilborg denied a motion to dismiss a Do Not Call claim based on texts. The order looked to Ninth Circuit decisions, including Satterfield and Howard, that have treated a text as a call under the TCPA, and applied that reading here. Those appellate cases arose under a different subsection, § 227(b).

In Wilson v. Easy Spirit (Mar. 31, 2026), Judge Russell denied a motion to dismiss. The order treated the marketing texts as telephone calls for the Do Not Call claim, so the case was not thrown out at the pleading stage.

In Owen-Brooks v. Better Homes & Gardens (Aug. 21, 2026), the court denied a motion to dismiss a Do Not Call claim based on texts and let the claim proceed. An earlier order in this district, Rubin v. Staples (Mar. 31, 2026), pointed the same way.

In Wilson v. Skopos Financial (July 21, 2025), Judge McShane denied a motion to dismiss under the Do Not Call provisions. The order is one of the district decisions in the Ninth Circuit that has treated a text as a call for this kind of claim, looking to circuit authority decided under § 227(b).

In Lewis v. Mom N Pop's Realty (Oct. 21, 2026), Magistrate Judge Claire, hearing the case with the parties’ consent, denied a motion to dismiss. The order treated the texts as calls for a Do Not Call claim and declined to follow Steidinger.

In Dovberg v. Haller Enterprises (Oct. 21, 2026), Judge Leeson denied a motion for judgment on the pleadings after analyzing the statute, and let the Do Not Call claim proceed. An earlier order by Judge Savage, in Pero v. Brown-Daub, pointed the same way.

In McGonigle v. ShoppersChoice.com (Feb. 13, 2026), Chief Judge Dick denied a motion to dismiss. The order read § 227(c)(5) to reach text messages, so the Do Not Call claim was not dismissed at the pleading stage.

In Arguello v. R.E.S.A. (Oct. 22, 2026), Judge Corley denied a motion to dismiss a Do Not Call claim arising from texts. An earlier order in this district, Wilson v. MEDVIDI (Judge Freeman), reached the same result. Both treated a text as a telephone call for this kind of claim.

In Callier v. The Finish Line (Sept. 8, 2026), Judge Boyle adopted a magistrate judge’s finding that § 227(c)(5) covers text messages. The district judge’s order, not an unreviewed recommendation, is the basis for the color here.

In Mey v. Liberty Home Guard (Jan. 5, 2026), Judge Bailey denied summary judgment. The order treated a text as a call under the TCPA and did not end the Do Not Call claim at that stage. Unlike a motion to dismiss, summary judgment looks beyond the initial pleadings.

In Esquivel v. Mona Lee (Nov. 24, 2025), Judge Huff denied a motion to dismiss. The order read § 227(c)(5) to cover text messages, so the Do Not Call claim was allowed to proceed past the pleading stage.

In Wilson v. Better Mortgage (Dec. 5, 2025), Judge Engelmayer denied a challenge to a Do Not Call claim and treated § 227(c) as covering text messages. The order was decided on a contested motion, not a default.

In Alvarez v. Fiesta Nissan (Jan. 26, 2026), Chief Judge Crane denied a motion to dismiss a contested claim. The order wrote that telephone calls, as used in this statute, include text messages.

The color here is weaker than in other districts that have treated texts as calls. It rests on default-judgment recommendations the district judge adopted in Duron and in Callier v. American Auto Group. No opinion was found in which both sides briefed whether a text is a telephone call. A contested case could be decided differently.

In Hopkins v. HomeLight (July 13, 2026), Judge Settle denied a motion to dismiss and let a Do Not Call claim based on texts proceed. On Oct. 8, 2026, the court declined to let the defendant appeal that ruling before a final judgment.

The Steidinger appeal came from this district. In Jones v. Blackstone Medical Services, 792 F. Supp. 3d 894 (C.D. Ill. 2025), the district court dismissed a class claim over marketing texts for home sleep tests. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on July 14, 2026, in Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, 182 F.4th 532. The panel said § 227(c)(5) does not authorize a suit for unwanted texts. It read “telephone call,” as used in 1991, to mean spoken communication, and it treated Congress’s use of “call or message” elsewhere as a sign that messages were left out of the private lawsuit. The opinion did not decide the separate autodialer provision, § 227(b).

Brown v. Hursh Group (Sept. 28, 2026) dismissed a class claim with prejudice, and Judge Brimmer reached the same result in Radvansky v. 1st Class Medical (Sept. 23, 2026). Both followed Steidinger: in 1991 a “telephone call” meant spoken communication over an instrument that reproduces sound, and a text does not. The Hursh Group order also said the FCC’s view did not require a different reading after McLaughlin.

No separate opinion from this district was found. Courts here have treated Steidinger as controlling. The Seventh Circuit held that § 227(c)(5) does not authorize a lawsuit for unwanted marketing texts, because the private claim is limited to telephone calls.

In Internicola v. MortgagePros (Sept. 24, 2026), Judge Moe adopted a magistrate judge’s recommendation, with no objection on this point, that § 227(c)(5) does not apply to text messages. Counts that rested on texts were dismissed with leave to amend. The order also said the private lawsuit does not reach the National Do Not Call rule in 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c). Earlier contested orders in James v. Smarter Contact (Judge Mizelle) and El Sayed v. Naturopathica (Judge Merryday) likewise treated texts as not calls.

In Card v. R.J. Reynolds (Sept. 3, 2026), Judge Eagles dismissed a contested Do Not Call claim. The order followed Steidinger and treated a text as not a telephone call under § 227(c)(5).

In Conrad v. Hart Consumer Products (Sept. 16, 2026), Judge Maze dismissed a contested Do Not Call claim. The order treated the marketing texts as outside the words “telephone call” in § 227(c)(5) and followed the Seventh Circuit’s reading in Steidinger.

In Davis v. CVS Pharmacy, 797 F. Supp. 3d 1270 (Aug. 26, 2025), Chief Judge Winsor dismissed Do Not Call claims about unwanted texts to a number on the National Registry. The order said an ordinary reader would not treat a text as a “telephone call,” and noted that a neighboring provision says “telephone call or message.” After McLaughlin, the court did not adopt the FCC’s earlier view. An Eleventh Circuit appeal was later dismissed.

Contested orders in Irvin v. Sonic Industries (Apr. 20, 2026) and Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers (Feb. 17, 2026, Judge Thrash) dismissed Do Not Call claims based on texts. Both treated a text as outside the words “telephone call” in § 227(c)(5).

No newer opinion from this district was found. Courts here have treated Steidinger as controlling, so earlier orders that counted texts as calls are no longer followed. Steidinger read “telephone call” in § 227(c)(5) as spoken communication and said the private Do Not Call lawsuit does not reach unwanted texts.

No separate opinion from this district was found. Courts here have treated Steidinger as controlling. The Seventh Circuit held that the private Do Not Call claim in § 227(c)(5) reaches repeated telephone calls, not unwanted text messages.

In Stockdale v. Skymount Property Group (Mar. 3, 2026), Judge Gaughan dismissed a contested claim and treated the texts as not calls under the Do Not Call provision. A later Sixth Circuit appeal was dismissed by agreement, so the appeals court did not decide the question.

No separate opinion from this district was found. Courts here have treated Steidinger as controlling. That Seventh Circuit decision said § 227(c)(5) does not authorize a lawsuit for unwanted marketing texts, because the private claim is written for telephone calls rather than messages.

Courts here have treated Steidinger as controlling. In addition, Judge Pratt treated texts as not calls in Richards v. Fashion Nova (Mar. 26, 2026), a contested order. Steidinger said the private right of action uses the narrower word “call,” while other parts of the statute say “call or message.”

In Rush v. SelectQuote (July 30, 2026), the court granted a motion to dismiss a proposed class claim. The plaintiff alleged two texts to a number on the National Do Not Call Registry. The order said the ordinary meaning of “call” in 1991 did not include texts, because a text does not reproduce sound, and it relied on Steidinger.

In Lowrey v. Twilio (Oct. 1, 2026), Judge Moon dismissed a contested claim on two grounds. First, a text is not a “telephone call” under § 227(c)(5). The order followed Steidinger and reasoned that saying “I’ll text you” is not the same as saying “I’ll call you.” Second, the order said a cell phone is not a residential telephone line for this private claim.

No separate opinion from this district was found. Courts here have treated Steidinger as controlling. The Seventh Circuit held that § 227(c)(5) does not authorize a lawsuit for unwanted marketing texts, because the private claim is limited to telephone calls.